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Taps for the Real Catch-22
A few months ago, two Navy wives accused a Navy chaplain of hav-
ing illicit affairs with them. Rather than court-martial the chaplain
for adultery (the prosecutor knew of no former prosecution for this
offense),' the Navy turned to a more serviceable weapon in its legal
arsenal, charging the chaplain with violating Article 133 of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by engaging in "conduct un-
becoming an officer and a genItleman." 2 In another controversial case,
an Army doctor who had criticized the Vietnam war was court-mar-
tialed for "conduct unbecoming" and for violating Article 134, which
prohibits "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order
and discipline in the armed forces" and "all conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces." 3 Just before his court-martial
was to begin, the doctor sought an injunction from the civil courts
challenging the constitutionality of these provisions. He lost'
Although never voided, Articles 133 and 134 present basic constitu-
tional questions. At first glance, they appear to be unconstitutionally
vague, and a closer analysis supports this impression. Yet such analysis
may not end discussion, since special constitutional standards often
apply in military law. Thus, in the past, concern for "the exigencies of
the service,' ''military necessity," or "discipline" has largely silenced
any examination of the constitutionality of the articles. The legality
of the articles becomes much more dubious, however, when a critical
examination of such phrases shows that no cogent military reason justi.
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1972, at 14, col. 3. Reluctance to charge Navy personnel with
adultery may have roots in, among other things, military necessity. According to a
shore patrolman at the chaplain's trial, "If they ever started busting sailors for adultery
they couldn't have enough men left to run a destroyer." Id.
2. 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970).
3. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970). Article 134 has a third clause prohibiting "all crimes antd of'
fenses not capital." This clause applies only to crimes and offenses proscribed by
Congress, United States v. Wysingle, 39 C.M.R. 693 (ACMR 1967), and thus Is not
in itself vague but, like 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1969), merely assimilative. See United States
v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907);
Wiener, Are the General Military Articles Unconstitutionally 1 ague? 54 A.B.A.J. 357,
358 (1968).
4. Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.), stay denied, 387 U.S. 915, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 960 (1967). The court insisted that a soldier complaining about court-martial
proceedings exhaust his military remedies before suing in a district court. Sea Noyd
v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
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fies rejecting civilian tests of vagueness. Moreover, the availability of a
viable, though less drastic, alternative to the articles virtually assures
their unconstitutionality.
I. The Articles Within Military Law
To the Court of Military Appeals, the constitutionality of Article
133, the "conduct unbecoming" provision, has "seemingly never been
in doubt."5 The court believes that a long tradition, predating the
Revolution, sufficiently defines the present meaning of "conduct un-
becoming." The court also notes that the First Congress, containing
fifteen of the thirty-nine signers of the Constitution, enacted a precur-
sor of Article 133 and that soon after the ratification of the Bill of
Rights, another Congress reenacted substantially the same Article of
War. Deferring to history, the court has always upheld Article 133.
The validity of Article 134 also strikes the Court of Military Ap-
peals as "well-settled."01 In 1953, it upheld Article 134 on its face, but
conceded the "conceivable presence of uncertainty" in the clauses
dealing with "prejudicial" and "discrediting" conduct7 Because Ar-
ticle 134 has been part of the United States military law since 1775,
however, the court judged it "not in vacuo, but in the context in which
the years have placed it."" The numerous specific offenses listed under
Article 134 in the Manual for Courts-Martial satisfied the court that
its terms have "acquired the core of a settled and understandable con-
tent of meaning."9 A unanimous court therefore concluded that the
article met constitutional standards of certainty.
As a result of such decisions, military judges no longer even seriously
consider constitutional challenges to Articles 133 and 134. When the
Army doctor, Captain Howard Levy, appealed his court-martial, an
Army Board of Review quickly dismissed his contentions, stating, "Ar-
ticles 133 and 134 have too many times withstood the overbroadness
and vagueness attacks to warrant again a defense."10 Later military
courts have repeated this assertion and eschewed analysis completely."'
5. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 176, 37 C.M.R. 429. 440 (1957). In
United States v. Lee, 4 C.M.R. 185, 189 (1952), the court had said Article 133's con-
stitutionality "can hardly be regarded as an open question in military law." See also
United States v. Giordano, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 163, 35 C.M.R. 135 (1964).
6. United States v. Sadinsky, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 564-65, 34 C.M.R. 343, 344-45 (1964).
7. United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 163, 7 C.M.R. 37, 39 (1953).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. United States v. Levy, 39 C.M.R. 672, 678 (ACMR 1968).
11. See United States v. Hale, 42 C.M.R. 429, 433 (ACMR 1970). rev'd on other
grounds, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 42 C.M.R. 342 (1970) (Article 133); United States v.
Maze, 42 C.M.R. 376, 379 (ACMR 1970) (Article 134); United States v. Amick, 40
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But Articles 133 and 134 do require another defense. The fixed at-
titude of military courts toward the articles contrasts sharply with a
more critical approach recently taken by the Supreme Court. In
O'Callahan v. Parker,12 decided in 1969, a soldier challenged the juris-
diction of a court-martial to try him for assaulting and attempting to
rape a civilian while off post and on leave. The Court sustained the
challenge, finding that the alleged crime was not "service connected."
Inasmuch as a violation of Article 134 was one of the charges, the
Court used the opportunity-albeit in dictum-to express its doubts
about that statute under civilian standards. After describing military
courts as "singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of con-
stitutional law,"' 3 the Court cited the clause referring to "prejudicial
conduct." "Does this satisfy the standards of vagueness as developed
by civil courts?" asked the Court, and, like Jesting Pilate, did not wait
for an answer.1
4
Two months later, Justice Douglas, who had written the Court's
opinion in O'Callahan, dealt again with Article 134's vagueness. In
his order releasing the war-critic doctor pending further appeal, Jus-
tice Douglas specifically noted that the constitutionality of Article 134
was an unresolved question since the O'Callahan -Court had "reserved
decision on whether Article 134 satisfies the standards of vagueness
required by due process."' 5
II. Civilian Standards of Vagueness
The standards referred to by Justice Douglas demand precise word-
ing in a penal statute. They have evolved over the years and are
"premised upon the fundamental notion that due process requires
governments to make explicit their choices among competing social
policies.""' As a consequence, a criminal law must give a potential
C.M.R. 720, 724 (ACMR 1969) (Article 134). These cases have led one commentator
to conclude that "any further attack [on the constitutional validity of Article 134]
would seem futile." Gaynor, Prejudicial and Discreditable Conduct: A Critical Ap-
praisal of the General Article, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 260 (1971).
12. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
13. Id. at 265.
14. Id. at 266.
15. Levy v. Parker, 396 U.S. 1204, 1205 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1969). The full
Court subsequently left Justice Douglas' order in effect until the district court ruled
on Levy's habeas corpus petition, Levy v. Parker, 396 U.S. 804 (1969), which the dis.
trict court eventually denied without any consideration of the vagueness claim, Levy v.
Parker, 316 F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
16. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 258 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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lawbreaker fair warning.' 7 Similarly, those who enforce the statute,
administrators and judges alike, also need clear guidelines.' 8 Finally,
criminal laws must not be so vague, or sweep so broadly, that they
make legal as well as illegal conduct subject to prosecution, 1' especial-
ly when such conduct deserves protection under the First Amend-
ment.20 Measured by these traditional criteria,21 Articles 133 and 134
are surely unconstitutional.
A. Lack of Fair Warning
A simple reading of the articles demonstrates that they fail to warn
potential offenders of what is prohibited. Article 133 never explains
what conduct "unbecomes" an officer or a "gentleman." PLather than
establishing rules of military or civilian etiquette,2 2 it imperils offi-
cers without real notice. Article 134 similarly fails to provide any
meaningful warning. As every authority (including the military) now
concedes, almost any improper or irregular act could somehow preju-
dice good order and discipline..2 3 Similarly, a serviceman can only
speculate as to what conduct may discredit the armed forces.
24
This statutory failure to distinguish between legal and illegal con-
duct may alone be fatal.2 5 The phrasing of the two articles closely
resembles civil statutes already nullified for vagueness. Because they
17. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 US.
156 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Palmer v. Euclid, 402 US. 544
(1971); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 506 US. 451 (1939).
18. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. Jacksonville. 405 U.S.
156 (1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147 (1959).
19. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 US. 104 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US. 479 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 US. 360 (1964).
20. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); United States v. Nat'l Dairy Corp.. 372
U.S. 29, 36 (1963); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959).
21. For a view that these criteria are only aspects, not the core, of the vagueness doc-
trine, see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 257-66 (1971) (Brennan, J., dLssenting).
See also Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
22. "An officer is expected to be a gentleman, and a gentleman has been defined as a
man who is never intentionally rude." D. REv.xot~s, TnE OFFicam's GunmE 45 (1969).
23. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES f, 213(a) (rev. ed. 1969); United States v.
Davis, 27 C.M.R. 908, 909 (CGCMR 1958); United States v. Rio POon, 26 C.M.R. 830, 832-
33 (CGCMR 1958); United States v. Norris, 8 C.M.R. 36, 39 (1953).
24. See generally Note, The Discredit Clause of the UCMJ: An Unrestricted Anachro-
nism, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 821 (1971). Partly for this reason, a court voided a police regula-
tion prohibiting conduct that will "reflect discredit [upon a policeman] or the Depart-
menL" Flynn v. Giarrusso, 321 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. La. 1971). See Note, Admission to the
Bar Following Conviction for Refusal of Induction, 78 YAtE L.J. 1352, 1361 (1969), where
the author reaches the same conclusion regarding "conduct which discredits the bar's
reputation."
25. See Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1968): "'Loitering'
has not been defined legislatively. . . . In the complete absence of statutory criteria by
which one [definition] can be objectively distinguished from the other, i'e find a fatal
constitutional flaw." See also Shinall v. Worrell, 319 F. Supp. 485 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
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were too vague, statutes penalizing "misconduct," 2 conduct that was
"annoying," 27 "reprehensible," 28 or "prejudicial to the best inter-
ests" 29 of a city have been voided by the Supreme Court. For the same
reason, lower federal courts have rejected prohibitions of conduct
that "reflects discredit,"30 or is "offensive," 3' "immoral," or "de-
moralizing."32 Such phrases seem equivalent to those of the articles,
and military courts have in fact used some of them interchangeably
with conduct "unbecoming an officer and a gentleman," "prejudicial
to good order and discipline," and "of a nature to bring discredit." 3
Rather than clarifying such indefinite language, military courts
have adopted, verbatim, the equally uncertain definitions of an 1886
treatise. Winthrop's classic Military Law and Precedents defines "un-
becoming" as "morally unbefitting and unworthy. 34 It describes a
''gentleman" as a "man of honor; ...of high sense of justice, of an
elevated standard of morals and manners, and of a corresponding gen-
eral deportment."35 Hence, Article 133 reaches official conduct that,
"in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing the individual as an officer,
seriously compromises his character and standing as a gentleman";
or private conduct that, "in dishonoring or disgracing the individual
personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as an
officer and exhibits him as morally unworthy to remain a member
of the honorable profession of arms." 36 Focusing on the predecessor
of Article 134, Winthrop construed it to prohibt only conduct whose
prejudice to good order and discipline is "reasonably direct and pal.
pable," and conduct that tends to bring the service into disrepute or
26. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
27. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
28. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
29. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
30. Flynn v. Giarrusso, 321 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. La. 1971); see also Schacht V. United
States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
31. Pritkin v. Thurman, 311 F. Supp. 1400 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
32. Oestreich v. Hale, 321 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
33. See United States v. Lee, 4 C.M.R. 185 (1952) ("reprehensible conduct"); United
States v. Rio Poon, 26 C.M.R. 830 (CGCMR 1958) ("universally reprehended").
34. W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 711 (2d ed. 1920 reprint) [hereinafter
cited as WINTHROP].
35. Id.
36. Id. at 713. See United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967);
United States v. Giordano, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 163, 35 C.M.R. 135 (1964). The problems with
this formulation are obvious:
An offense is the limit of tolerance below the ideal standard that is compromising,
taking all circumstances into consideration. [Hlowever, there would be as many
opinions as there are officers as to where that level of tolerance converts to a toler-
able standard, and finally where that level converts to a criminal act.
Nelson, Conduct Expected of an Officer and a Gentleman: Ambiguity, 12 AFJAG L. R V.
124, 125 (1970).
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lower it in the public esteem.3 7 But, as is obvious, Winthrop's treatise
and decisions based on it provide little guidance, for they still force
servicemen to guess as to the meaning of the articles. Indeed, Winthrop
himself thought it "desirable that some of the Articles should be
made more precise .... 38
Nor does the Manual for Courts-Martial-which lists specific of-
fenses punishable under the two articles-infuse the statutes with
greater clarity. First, the Manual's "Form Specifications" are not ex-
clusive,39 so that no amount of study will reveal all the possible of-
fenses under the articles. Second, the Manual includes so many unre-
lated offenses that no "core" of settled meaning emerges.40 Finally,
and most importantly, nothing in the Manual can define violations
of Articles 133 and 134 without itself violating the constitutional
separation of powers. The President promulgated the Manual after
Congress requested him to establish rules of procedure and evidence
for courts-martial and to fix maximum penalties for military of-
fenses. 41 Within those realms, therefore, the Manual has the force of
law.42 But, as Justice Black stated in Reid v. Covert,
If the President can provide rules of substantive law as well as
procedure, then he and his military subordinates exercise leg-
islative, executive and judicial powers with respect to those
subject to military trials. Such blending of functions in one
branch of the Government is the objectionable thing which the
draftsmen of the Constitution endeavored to prevent by provid-
ing for the separation of governmental powers.
43
Thus, the Court of Military Appeals has repeatedly held that a sub-
stantive rule of law in the Manual is not always valid 44 More than
37. IVINTHRop at 723. For cases adopting this standard, see, e.g., United States v. Sadin-
sky, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 34 C.M.R. 343 (1964); United States v. Holiday, 4 U.S.C.M..
454, 16 C.M.R. 28 (1954). But, "It is not always easy to tell what act fits in this cate-
gory... United States v. Davis, 27 C.M.R. 908, 909 (ACMR 1958).
38. WINTHROp at 24.
39. United States v. Fisher, 6 C.M.R. 195 (ACMR 1952); cf. Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d
929, 932 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
40. The list includes 58 different offenses ranging from abusing a public animal, crimi-
nal libel, to fleeing the scene of an accident, and assault with intent to commit murder.
41. 10 U.S.C. §§ 36, 56 (1970).
42. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
43. 354 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1957). Thus, "neither can the President, in war more than in
peace, intrude upon the proper authority of Congress .... " Massachusetts v. Laird,
400 U.S. 886, 893 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoting Ex Parle Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 139 (1866). "No less than the war power-the greatest leveller of them all-is
the power of the Commander-in-Chief subject to constitutional limitations." Id. at 897.
44. United States v. Acosta-Vargas, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 388, 32 C.M.R. 888 (1952); United
States v. Smith, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 105, 32 C.M.R. 105 (1962); United States v. McCormick, 12
U.S.C.M.A. 26, 30 C.M.R. 26 (1960); Hagan, The General Article-Elemental Confusion,
10 MIi. L. REv. 63, 78 (1960).
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once, that court has disregarded the Manual's definition of an of-
fense because it found no
basis for the proposition that the President may create an of-
fense under the Code. To the contrary, our forefathers reposed
in Congress alone the power "To make rules for the govern-
ment and regulation of the land and naval forces."..... The Presi-
dent's power as Commander-In-Chief does not embody legislative
authority to provide crimes and offenses.45
Accordingly, insofar as it looks to the Manual for a definition of Ar-
ticle 134, the 1953 Court of Military Appeals decision is inconsistent
with constitutional theory and that court's own later decisions.
B. Susceptibility to Arbitrary Enforcement
The vagueness that deprives servicemen of warning also precludes
fathomable guidelines for applying Articles 133 and 134, thereby
giving extraordinary latitude to the commanders who administer
them. Such remarkable elasticity makes the articles the real "Catch-
22" of American military law. A similar provision was dubbed the
"Devil's Article" by British troops, who knew that it could embrace
almost all conduct disapproved by superiors.40 In the United States,
soldiers have always called 134 the "General Article," and recently be-
gan applying the same rubric to 133. 47 Yet the vagueness doctrine is
designed to insure that penal statutes cannot be enforced arbitrarily
or discriminatorily.
48
For the reasons noted above,49 it would be a mistake to think of
the Manual for Courts-Martial as a bulwark against arbitrary and dis-
criminatory enforcement of the General Articles. At most, the Manual
reflects only tradition. Any objective usage discerned in it is illusory
since the Manual itself disclaims any attempt to exhaust the list of pos-
45. United States v. McCormick, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 28, 30 C.M.R. 26, 28 (1960) (em.
phasis added); see also Everett, Article 134, UCMJ-A Study in Vagueness, 37 N.C,
L. REv. 142, 149, 160 (1959); Note, General Article Void for Vagueness? 34 NLu. L. R v.
518, 523-27 (1955).
46. Nichols, The Devil's Article, 22 MIL. L. REV. 111, 112 (1963).
47. See United States v. Hale, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 150, 42 C.M.R. 3412 (1970); Wiener, supra
note 3.
48. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). "[I]f arbitrary and discrimina
tory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who
apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application." Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108.09
(1972).
49. See p. 1523 supra.
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sible offenses. Moreover, as one military court has said, "In some
cases even the Manual is mistaken as to what belongs under Article
134."5o Since the Manual merely lists offenses previously recognized,
it thus looks ultimately to military courts and commanders to give
the General Articles concrete meaning on a case-by-case basis.
The Court of Military Appeals believes courts-martial can clear
up any unavoidable ambiguity in the General Articles. But without
a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt from the articles, court-
martial panels can create their own measure in each case. According
to civilian cases, such discretion is plainly impermissible', 2 As the
Supreme Court stated in 1966:
It is established that a law fails to meet the requirement of the
Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves
the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves
judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed stand-
ards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.5
The General Articles clearly vest local military commanders, who
are primarily responsible for their enforcement, with at least as much
discretion as unconstitutionally vague vagrancy or disorderly con-
duct statutes give policemen on the beatY5 Such discretion con-
stitutes a prime vice of vagueness. As Judge Bazelon observed in the
Levy case, "one of the evils" of a vague statute like Article 134 is "that
it leaves the definition, and therefore the creation, of crimes to the
discretion of minor executive or military officials."53
Thus, not surprisingly, the ambiguity of the General Articles allows
selective enforcement against servicemen whose conduct offends cur-
rent military mores. For example, when Brigadier General Billy Mitch-
ell vigorously advocated use of air power after World War I, he be-
50. United States v. Cole, 30 C.M.R. 755, 756 (CGCMR 1961).
51. United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 163, 7 C.M.R. 37, 39 (1953); see also
Gaynor, supra note 11, at 267.
52. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Hendon v. Lowry, 301 US. 242 (1937).
53. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (196. Allowing courts.martial to
determine the scope of the articles produces what is in effect a military common law of
crimes. Such common law definition has consistently been rejected by federal courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); Hagan, supra note 45;
Wiener, supra note 3, at 361.
54. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). "Such vagueness . . .
compels enforcement officers, as well, to guess at what violates the law, thus either
setting the stage for arbitrary police action, or if police and prosecutors evolve their
own rational standards of enforcement, constituting an inappropriate delegation of
criminal lawmaking authority." Scott v. District Attorney, 309 F. Supp. 833, 836 (E.D.
La. 1970).
55. Levy v. Corcoran, 389 F.2d 929, 932 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
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came unpopular with his more conservative superiors and was court-
martialed for conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. Some
forty years later, when an Army doctor quietly complained to Gen-
eral Westmoreland about working conditions in Vietnam, the doc-
tor's commanding officer used Article 133 to court-martial him for
shaving at night instead of in the morning. Only on appeal was the
doctor's conviction reversedr 0 But in light of past abuses, such safe-
guards of appellate or judicial review do not always ensure proper
enforcement. 57
C. Overbreadth
Quite apart from the lack of fair notice and meaningful enforce-
ment guidelines, the General Articles are also overbroad. They now
cover certain activities associated with the First Amendment. During
the Vietnam war, the armed forces have frequently court-martialed
servicemen for "uttering disloyal statements," a violation of Article
134.08 In 1967, a lieutenant, off duty and in civilian clothes, took
part in an off-post demonstration, carrying a sign criticizing the
war and the President. The lieutenant's actions led to an Army court-
martial for "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."0 0 The
General Articles also reach other First Amendment conduct beyond
political speech. They make it illegal to use "insulting" language to
women or children or about other servicemen even where "insulting"
falls short of "obscene."' 0  They may also impinge on freedom of as-
sociation. For example, servicemen are not allowed to associate pub-
56. United States v. Wolfson, 36 C.M.R. 722 (ACMR 1966). The phrase "conduct of
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces" has even more freakish possibilities.
It could well threaten a field commander with court-martial whenever he lost a battle,
Or perhaps the General Staffs during the Vietnam Era should fear charges against them
for tarnishing the military's image.
57. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969); see p. 1519 supra. lut see
Gaynor, supra note 11, at 289: "It is a tribute to those who have administered military
justice through the years that there has been no great clamor to remove the vagueness.
58. United States v. Gray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 42 C.M.R. 255 (1970); United States v.
Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970); United States v. Harvey, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970); United States v. Amick, 40 C.M.R. 720 (ACMR
1969); United States v. Bell, 40 C.M.R. 807 (ACMR 1969); United States v. Harvey, 40
C.M.R. 941 (ACMR 1969); see Note, Military Personnel and the First Amendment:
"Discreditable Conduct" as a Standard for Restricting Political Activity, 65 YALE L.J.
1207 (1956).
59. United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 555 (ACMR 1966), alf'd, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37
C.M.R. 429 (1967). Lt. Howe was also convicted of Article 88's prohibition on contemptu-
ous statements of superiors by officers-another clause of dubious wisdom and constitu.
tionality.
60. United States v. Beauregard, 31 C.M.R. 680 (AFCMB. 1962); United States v.
Downard, I C.M.R. 405 (ACIR 1951). Compare Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)
(civilian statute prohibiting "abusive language," unconstitutionally vague).
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licly with notorious prostitutes or other sexual deviates.0 ' Nor are
officers permitted to fraternize with enlisted men.0 2
Although the exigencies of military life may impose limits on a
serviceman's First Amendment rights, he certainly retains some of
them.63 According to the Department of Defense,
the service member's right of expression should be preserved to
the maximum extent possible, consistent with good order and
discipline and the national security.04
Thus a serviceman may sign petitions for specific legislative action
or write to the editors of newspapers to express personal views on
public issues.65 But fear of punishment under the General Articles
may curtail free and full exercise of First Amendment rights.
[W]here a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic
First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise
of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens
to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" ... than if the boundaries
of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.00
To avoid this "chilling effect," civil statutes regulating conduct
at or near the borders of the First Amendment must be more specific
than other laws. 67 Government may regulate in the area of First
61. United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 417 (1958); United States
v. Yeast, 36 C.M.R. 890 (AFCMR 1966); United States v. Mallory, 17 C.M.R. 409 (ACMR
1954).
62. United States v. Lovejoy, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 18, 42 C.M.R. 210 (1970); United States V.
Livingston, 8 C.M.R. 206, 210 (ACMR 1952), petition denied, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 676, 8 C.M.R.
178 (1953).
63. Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972);
Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp. 849, 852 (D.S.C. 1969), aflfd, 429 F.2d 427
(4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 US. 981 (1971); T. E.smsoN, TiIE SYSTEt OF FMEE.,ot OF
EXPREssION 57-58 (1970); Note, Dissenting Servicemen and the First Amendment, 58 Gro.
L.J. 534 (1970). In his order releasing Captain Levy on bail, Justice Douglas said, "The ex-
tent to which First Amendment rights available to civilians are not available to servicemen
is a new and pressing problem." Levy v. Parker, 396 U.S. 1204, 1205 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1969).
64. DOD Directive 1325.6. But "the proper balancing of these interests will depend
largely upon the calm and prudent judgment of the responsible commander." Id.
65. DOD Directive 1344.10.
66. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
67. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Thus, it was wrong for the Court of Military Appeals, as support for tolerating vagueness
in Article 134, to quote Justice Holmes: "the law is full of instances where a man's fate
depends on his estimating rightly ... some matter of degree." Nash v. United States, 2
U.S. 373, 377 (1912), quoted in United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.MA. 161, 163, 7 C.M.R.
37, 39 (1953). Holmes wrote "in a context of economic regulations which are restrained by
few, if any, constitutional guarantees. Where, however, constitutional guarantees are im-
plicated, the standards are more exacting." United States v. Vuitch, 402 US. 62. 77 Q971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
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Amendment freedoms only with "narrow specificity." 08 Otherwise,
such laws may deter perfectly lawful conduct and lead to selective
enforcement.0 9 Since the General Articles can reach protected conduct
and are not at all specific, they are by civilian standards unconstitu-
tionally overbroad.
Moreover, insofar as the General Articles implicate the First Amend-
ment, they are void on their face. This conclusion is inescapable from
recent Supreme Court decisions that refused to consider the precise
conduct to which an overly broad statute had been applied."' Only
last year, in Coates v. Cincinnati,71 the Court voided on its face a
statute prohibiting "annoying conduct." Since the statute might pos-
sibly reach First Amendment conduct, the Court did not inquire as
to how it was applied.
These recent cases also confer standing to challenge the articles on
any serviceman charged under them. He need not show that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a more narrowly drawn statute. For
if the law required such a showing, other servicemen might well refrain
from exercising their constitutional rights for fear of court-martial
provided by statutes susceptible of application to protected conduct. 2
Thus, even where a serviceman is accused under Article 134 of an of-
fense as clearly criminal as assault with intent to murder, lie may
properly assert that Article 134 is void on its face regardless of how
it is applied in his case. 73
Consequently, by civilian standards, the General Articles have several
defects.74 They do not give fair notice; nor can any warning be found
68. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972), quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963).
69. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972). The Court of Military Appeals mis-
construed the Button line of cases to mean that a law is void only if it is applied
solely to interfere with First Amendment rights. United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.CM.A. 165,
176, 37 C.M.R. 429, 440 (1967). But the cases contain no such limitation.
70. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616
(1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360,
366 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S.
17, 21-22 (1960). But see Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 111 (1972), in which tile Court
said, "petitioner's own conduct was not immune under the First Amendment and neither
is his conviction vulnerable on the ground that the statute threatens constitutionally pro.
tected conduct of others." But Colten turned on a statute that required intent, and can
therefore be distinguished.
71. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
72. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
73. Even if the cases do not require voiding the General Articles on their face, it Is
easy to imagine a case in which the Articles were applied in such an unappealing fashion
that they cried out for voiding. Such a case would involve an offense not listed in the
Table of Maximum Punishments or Form Specifications, or discussed in the Manual. The
offense might be unprecedented or raise a serious First Amendment question, perhaps
one that offends prevailing constitutional sensibilities. Finally, the offense could have
little or no effect on military discipline, so that it would not be malumn in se.
74. Article 134 convictions have the additional defect of being based on vague instruc-
tions to the triers of fact. A court-martial can convict a serviceman of violating Article
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in limiting judicial constructions or usage as codified by the Manual.
Moreover, they contain no ascertainable criteria for guilt and thus
give undue discretion to enforcement officials. Of perhaps even greater
significance, the articles may reach conduct protected by the Constitu-
tion. By both civilian theory and precedent, therefore, the General
Articles are unconstitutional.
75
III. Applicability of Civilian Standards
Before a court considers which standards are appropriate for judg-
ing the General Articles, it must decide the threshold question of
jurisdiction. O'Callahan's jurisdictional requirement of "service-con-
nection" may well eliminate some abuses of vagueness. Because O'Cal-
lahan necessitates a close nexus between the acts and the service, it has
probably made a dead letter of the "discreditable conduct" clause of
Article 134.76 As a result, most off-post conduct is no longer subject to
the "discredit" clause, or for that matter to any other section in tie
UCMJ.77 On-post conduct, although obviously more likely to be
134 if it believes his conduct was "prejudicial to good order and discipline or of such a
nature to bring discredit on the armed forces." MANUAL FOR Cotwrs.MAIMAL UNITED
STATES 213(d); MiLrrARY JUDGE'S GUIDE, DA Pan 27-9 (May 1969); United States v. Vara,
27 C.M.R. 825 (NCMR 1958); United States v. French, 25 C.M.R. 851 (AFCMR 1958).
Under several cases, if one of the possible reasons for a finding of guilty is vague, then
the entire conviction must be reversed. Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970); Street
v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1968); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 539 (1931).
Nor do the General Articles possess any of the virtues that might save an otherwise
vague statute. Offenses rarely require scienter. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972);
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945). Moreover, the General Articles differ greatly from penal statutes whose subject
matters, by their very nature, do not lend themselves to adequately precise formulation.
Obscenity laws, for instance, aim at conduct that even the Supreme Court has difficulty
defining. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. At-
torney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502
(1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957). Since the Constitution asks less than the impossible of legislatures. Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957), quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 US. 1, 7-8 (1947),
it tolerates imprecision in a word, like "'obscenity," that necessarily forms the hard.to.dc-
fine crux of the offense. Griffiths, The Limits of Criminal Law Scholarship, 79 YALE
L.J. 1388, 1463 (1970). The activities covered by Articles 133 and 134, however, lack any
definable connecting thread. The General Articles are simply a collection of miscellaneous
offenses and have thus earned the title of "catch-all." O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 US. 258,
273 (1969).
75. See Bishop, "The Quality of Military Justice," N.Y. Times, § 6, Feb. 22., 1970, at
32; Hodson, Perspective The Manual for Courts-Martial-1984, 57 Mit L. RM. 1, 12
(1972); Sherman, Congressional Proposals for Reform of Military Law, 10 Au.r. Cnu.a. L.
Rav. 25, 31-32 (1971); Wiener, supra note 3, at 363.
76. See Note, supra note 24, at 822 n.6; cf. Note, Imprisonnlet for Debt: In the
Military Tradition, 80 YALE L.J. 1679 (1971). The discredit clause was not part of the
original General Article; it was added in 1916, supposedly for the sole purpose of reach-
ing retired servicemen.
77. Because O'Callahan has been limited to offenses committed on United States terri-
tory, servicemen committing civilian-type offenses off post while in a foreign country are
still tried by court-martial. See, e.g., United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 6, 41 C.M.R.
64 (1969).
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"service-connected," 78 still may lack the necessary nexus. Like a civilian
government employee, a serviceman should have some right of privacy
that precludes a court-martial for wrongful cohabitation, pandering,
indecent acts with another, bigamy, or adultery, all of which are still
listed as offenses under Article 134. Rather than embarrassment or
transitory discomfort to institutions caused by unconventional con-
duct, only a specific connection between the discrediting conduct and
accomplishment of the service's mission should now trigger military
jurisdiction.,9 The same considerations should also apply to "conduct
unbecoming."
If such jurisdictional prerequisites are met, the General Articles
should still survive the test of constitutionality only if some excuse
exists for not applying civilian standards. This question has received
little critical analysis. The Court of Military Appeals has assumed
that civilian standards are appropriate, 0 but has not applied them
stringently to the General Articles. The lack of close scrutiny results
in part from an interpretation of an old line of Supreme Court cases.
A superficial reading of those decisions may suggest that the Court
has approved less exacting vagueness standards for military statutes.
But placing them in historical perspective and analyzing the possible
reasons for special military standards demonstrates that, in fact, no
peculiarity of military life justifies lenient tests for vague statutes.
In Dynes v. Hoover,81 decided in 1858, the Supreme Court held
that an old Navy counterpart of Article 134 covered attempted de-
sertion. Moreover, any acts condemned "by the usages in the navy
of all nations" also came under this "comprehensive enactment." 2
The "apparent indeterminateness" of the statute never impressed the
Court as
liable to abuse, for what those crimes are and how they are to be
punished, is well known by practical men in the navy and the
army, and by those who have studied the law of courts-martial'
78. Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
79. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
80. United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 163, 7 C.M.R. 37, 39 (1953).
81. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
82. Id. at 82.
83. Id. Paradoxically, but most significantly, the Court of Military Appeals has disre-
garded such traditional deference to military men (Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553,
562 (1897); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1886)). In United States v. Sadinsky,
14 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 34 C.M.R. 343 (1964), the accused did a backflip off an aircraft car-
rier, but no order or regulation forbade such unusual conduct. Since the accused violated
no prohibition, the Board of Review, composed of Navy officers on active duty, dis-
missed the charges for failing to state an offense under Article 134. But the civilian
judges on the Court of Military Appeals reversed the "practical men in the navy" who
are supposedly more aware of what conduct violates unwritten military law.
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Dynes thus appears to settle the vagueness issue, and for a time the
Court decided subsequent Article 134 cases without defending the
statute's breadth or lack of precision.
8 4
But the Court may now be ready to reconsider its approach to Ar-
ticles 133 and 134, as the rhetorical question in O'Callahan strongly
suggests.s 5 The Court could easily explain away Dynes as decided in
a far distant constitutional era, many years before the void-for-vague-
ness doctrine developed its present contours.80 Since the cases follow-
lowing Dynes contain no discussion of the vagueness issue, the Court
last considered the question one hundred and fifteen years ago, and
even then in a rather conclusory fashion.8 7 If, on the other hand, the
Court wants to uphold long-standing practices without mechanically
deferring to precedent,88 it might join the unusual features of military
law with the history of Articles 133 and 134 to analogize offenses
under them to state common law crimes. In 1953, for instance, the
Court said,
Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists sep-
arate and apart from the law which governs in our federal ju-
dicial establishment.""
But military law, while concededly unique in many respects, is never-
theless federal law; courts-martial result in federal convictions. Even
84. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553
(1897); Fletcher v. United States, 148 U.S. 84 (1893); Smith v. Vhitney, 116 U.S. 167
(1886); Ex Parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1882). But see Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl.
173 (1893); Fletcher v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 541 (1891). In Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 30 (1942), the Court relied on Dynes to uphold another vague law. A military commis-
sion had tried Nazi saboteurs under that statute for violating the "law of war." Forsaking
any conventional vagueness criteria, the Court said Congress could properly choose be-
tween spelling out every specific offense under the "law of war" or enacting a broad
statute that would include all such offenses. But the Court based its decision on the fact
that the Constitution itself allows Congress to "define and punish" offenses against the
"law of nations." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. In contrast, Articles 13 and 134 come
from another constitutional provision: the power to "make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces." Id. at cl. 14.
85. See p. 1520 supra.
86. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2742, 2771 (1972) (concurring opinions of
Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.) (death penalty violates "evolving standards" of Eighth
Amendment).
87. "This conclusory assertion, unreasoned and unaccompanied by citation, surely
cannot foreclose consideration of the question in a case that squarely 
presents the issue."
United States v. Welsh, 898 U.S. 333, 359 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (question of
non-religious conscientious objectors not considered in earlier cases). See also Furman v.
Georgia, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2750 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring): "Past assumptions, how-
ever, are not sufficient to limit the scope of our examination of this [question] today.
. [W]e cannot avoid the question by recalling past cases that never directly con-
sidered it."
88. "If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will
need a strong case" for the Constitution to affect it. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 654,
678 (1970), quoting Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
But see Furman v. Georgia, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972) (death penalty unconstitutional).
89. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
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in the civilian field, modern criminal law has retreated from com-
mon law crimes. 0 Both the ordinary federal rule against common
law crimes and the void-for-vagueness doctrine reflect a fear of arbi-
trary power.91 In the military sphere, where commanders have almost
absolute power, these considerations should have particular force.
An even more telling objection to Dynes is that it completely ig-
nores the only permissible reasons for treating constitutional rights
of soldiers differently from those of civilians. It stops its inquiry pre-
cisely where critical analysis should begin, for it is no longer enough
to say that civilian life is different from military life. 2 Rather, as the
Court of Military Appeals has often stated in recent years, a soldier
retains all his civilian constitutional rights except those expressly
withheld or impliedly withdrawn. 93 The constitutional right implicit
in the vagueness doctrine-the right to precise penal statutes-belongs
to neither class. It is not expressly withheld by the Constitution nor
impliedly withdrawn by a contemporary construction or military
necessity.
For servicemen, the vagueness doctrine finds its constitutional source
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In the classic
case of Connally v. General Construction Co., the Supreme Court
termed that doctrine the "first essential of due process. 04 Of course,
not all the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment apply to servicemen.
The right to grand jury indictment in the Amendment is explicitly
excepted from those "cases arising in the land or naval forces or the
militia, when in time of war or actual public danger." 9 But "due
90. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal
Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 177 (1969).
91. Id.; see Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy statute de-
clared void for failure to give fair notice and encouraging arbitrary arrests). Moreover,
the Articles reflect a tradition at odds with respect for individual soldiers: "(F]ros
the time of the Colonies, this country has despised pressgangs, floggings, martinetismn,
and all of the other Old World military practices which demeaned the rank and file.
Its military system was founded on the dignity of man, just as was its constitution." TilE
ARMED FORCES OFFicER 4, DA Pam 600-2 (1968).
92. To justify the General Articles, one leading commentator stresses the differences
between an armed force and civilian society, invoking the advice of Holmes that "we
need education in the obvious." Weiner, supra note 3, at 561. In another context, the
same advice provoked the following response: "On the contrary .... it is the superficially
'obvious' which prevents any significant progress in our understanding of the criminal
law. . . .Surely that sort of knowledge of the 'obvious' has demonstrated its bankruptcy
by now." Griffiths, The Limits of Criminal Law Scholarship, 79 YALE L.J. 1388, 1467
(10).
93. United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967); United States
v. Crawford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A.
429, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960); United States v. Ivory, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 516, 522, 26 C.M.R. 296,
302 (1958) (Quinn, C.J., concurring); id. at 523, 26 C.M.R. at 303 (Ferguson, J., concur-
ring).
94. 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Only last term, the Court referred to the vagueness doc-
trine as a "basic principle of due process." Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 10-1, 108 (1972).
95. U.S. CONsT. amend. v. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272 n.18 (1969).
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process of law" occurs in a different, completely unrelated clause. Thus
nothing in the Constitution restricts "due process" to civilians.
To view the General Articles as implied exceptions because they
are contemporary constructions of the Constitution oversimplifies his-
tory. In initially enacting the articles, the First Congress merely copied
them from the British Articles of War °0 Clearly, however, basic
principles of British military law clash with American political theory.
Long before 1776, England paid less heed to the separation of powers,
allowing the monarch to issue all military law and to define military
crimes.97 Nevertheless, in borrowing the British General Articles the
First Congress overlooked these unusual factors. The oversight is
understandable, for the Constitution and the Bill of Rights-with
their doctrines of separation of powers and of due process-had not yet
been written. But no happenstance of timing ought to count more
than actual consideration of the problem, lest contemporary construc-
tion (an unreliable guide at best) o become a treacherous shorthand
label that eliminates factual examination.
In addition to an alleged contemporary construction of the Con-
stitution, "military necessity" might also imply an exception. 0 In-
deed, of all the arguments for limiting a serviceman's constitutional
rights, "military necessity" is the one most often made and accepted.
Although Justice Douglas has said that "the rules of due process
which [military tribunals] apply are constitutional rules which we,
not they, formulate,"1 00 the Court of Military Appeals has considered
"military necessity" in its definition of "military due process."101 How-
ever, the particular necessity at issue is rarely, if ever, examined. On
the contrary, "military necessity" has turned into a trump phrase, a
quick way to stifle debate. Thus, in upholding Article 134, the Court
of Military Appeals alluded to special military considerations, but
96. Wiener, supra note 3, at 358. However, "the Founders shared a deep fear of an
unchecked military branch. But what they feared was a military branch unchecked by
the legislature, and susceptible of use by an arbitrary executive power." Reid %. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 68 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
97. "It is clear from the text of the Constitution, writings contemporaneous with its
adoption, commentaries on it, and decisions of the Supreme Court subsequent to its
adoption that, in the military field, the powers attributed to the King by Blackstone
were distributed to the President and to the Congress... .But the King's power ...
to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, was trans.
ferred from the Executive to the Legislative branch of government." United States v.
Smith, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 105, 117, 32 C.M.R. 105, 117 (1962). See Nichols, supra note 46,
at 114.
98. If "contemporary construction" were always foolproof, Marbury v. Madison, 5 US.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803), would not have turned out the way it did.
99. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
100. Id. at 154 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101. United States v. Crawford, 15 US.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964); United States
v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.MA. 199, 206, 33 C.M.R. 411, 418 (1963).
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identified none.1 02 According to the court, military exigencies "are
at once so patent and so compelling as to dispense with the necessity
for their enumeration-much less their argumentative develop.
ment."'1 -3 But such an approach obviously begs the question. Upon
further inquiry, only three general military considerations exist; and
they by no means "compel" an elimination of the first essential of
due process.
One consideration involves maintaining high standards of conduct
in the armed forces."04 The General Articles supposedly attain this
objective by imposing high standards of conduct. According to the
articles' defenders, a strict code of honor prevents military standards
from declining to the level of a mere criminal code.10 5 But the need
for high standards has not been persuasive to federal courts in analo-
gous situations. Within the last three years, two federal courts have
voided police department regulations patterned after the General
Articles. 00 These decisions are analytically significant because police
departments are quasi-military organizations that depend on military-
like discipline and esprit de corps. Moreover, the Supreme Court
stated in NAACP v. Button, in 1963, that:
It is no answer to the constitutional claims [of vagueness and
overbreadth] to say . . . that the purpose of these regulations
was merely to insure high professional standards and not to cur-
tail free expression.10 7
Thus, an interest in maintaining professional standards is not so "com-
pelling" that a government may "under the guise of prohibiting pro-
fessional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights."' 08
102. United States v. Frantz, 2 US.C.M.A. 161, 163-64; 7 C.M.R. 37, 39-40 (1953).
103. Id.
104. United States v. Kirksey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 20 C.M.R. 272 (1955); Wiener, supra
note 3, at 363. "[B]ehavior of officers ought to be more exemplary than the conduct of
enlisted personnel." United States v. Claypool, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 302, 30-4, 27 C.M.R. 576,
378 (1959); see generally Nelson, supra note 36. "In the eighteenth century at least the
'honor' of an officer was thought to give a specific military connection to a crime other-
wise without military significance." O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 270 n.14 (1969).
But after O'Callahan, the same rules of service-connection apply to both officers and
enlisted men. United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 259 (1969).
105. Wiener, supra note 3, at 363; Wiener, The Perils of Tinkering with Military
Justice, 20 ARMY (No. 11) 22, 25 (1970). The favorite quotation is:
In military life there is a higher code termed honor, which holds its society to
stricter accountability; and it is not desirable that the standard of the Army shall
come down to the requirements of a criminal code.
Fletcher v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 541, 563 (1891), afj'd, 148 U.S. 84 (1893).
106. Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1970); Flynn v. Giarrusso, 321 F. Stipp,
1295 (E.D. La. 1971). But the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to a state de-
cision involving police regulations identical to the Articles. De Panicis v. Dcp't of 'ub.
lic Safety, 404 U.S. 1000 (1971).
107. 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963).
108. Id. at 439.
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A second possible military interest might be ease of conviction. If
military discipline were necessary at any cost, commanders might
think conviction and punishment should follow perfunctorily. Vague,
catch-all statutes do make convictions easier to obtain. But ease of
conviction can no longer justify inadequate judicial procedures in
the military. Indeed, an accused serviceman now is guaranteed pro-
cedural safeguards that in some respects compare quite favorably to
their civilian counterparts. Furthermore, if ease of conviction were
the prime goal, the UCMJ would need only two articles, 133 and
134. Certainly their language could include every other offense under
the Code. 109 Yet the vagueness of the General Articles differs markedly
from the relative specificity of the other punitive articles.
Finally, the military may claim that the General Articles are neces-
sary as a means of justifying punishment for servicemen who commit
unforeseen crimes. 1 0 Man's ingenuity precludes any penal code,
civilian or military, from explicitly covering every potential offense.
But this justification for vagueness is given short shrift by civilian
courts. The crucial question is whether military life demands a dif-
ferent result."' Few military crimes are unprecedented or original.
Armies and navies have existed long enough to catalogue the prime
sources of trouble, especially those posing a real threat to military
discipline. The most extreme military situations, such as charging
an enemy position, do not provide countervailing examples. In such
cases, if a serviceman commits some hitherto unknown offense, one
of his military superiors has only to order him to stop. If the culprit
continues, he can be court-martialled for ivillfully disobeying an
order."2 Those especially rare cases where a serviceman commits an
unforeseen offense, before a superior can order him to stop, pit a
supposed military need against the fundamental rights of all service-
men. But this threat to discipline is rather remote and unlikely, while
the deprivation of fundamental rights is real and continual. Believ-
ing such a threat to individual servicemen outweighs the danger
to the military organization, the Acting Judge Advocate General of
109. Cf. United States v. O'Neal, 26 C.M.R. 924, 928 (AFCMR 1958).
110. Ackroyd, The General Articles, Articles 133 and 134 of the UCMJ, 35 ST. JohN's
L. RFv. 258 (1961); Wiener, supra note 3, at 364; United States v. Moore, 33 C.M.R. 667,
673 (CGCMR 1963) (dissenting opinion).
111. With a novelist's help, the mind's eye can picture the following bizarre exchange:
"[W]e accuse you also of the commission of crimes and infractions ive don't even
know about yet. Guilty or innocent?"
"I don't know, sir. How can I say if you don't tell me what they are?"
"How can we tell you if we don't know?" J. HwT.aa, Crcn.22 400 (1961).
112. Article 92, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1970). See Everett, Article 134-A Study in
Vagueness, 37 No. CAR. L. REv. 142, 160 (1959).
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the Army told Congress after World War I that any military code
of law
should be in keeping with the progress of enlightened govern-
ment and should not be inconsistent with those fundamental
principles of law which have ever characterized Anglo-American
jurisprudence. The Military Code . . . should be specific with
respect to the definition of the offenses denounced.11-3
Just recently, the Chief Judge of the Army Court of Military Review,
himself a former Judge Advocate General, came out for abolishing
Article 134. "We don't really need it," he said, "and we can't defend
our use of it in this modern world."' 1
Thus, there appears to be no compelling reason for allowing the
military to violate civilian standards of vagueness.
IV. "Least Possible Power Adequate to the End Proposed"
But even if court-martialing all possible troublemakers were a
military necessity, Congress must achieve its objective by granting
courts-martial the "least possible power adequate to the end pro-
posed.""15 In O'Callahan, the "least possible power" rule limited
military jurisdiction to service-connected offenses.'1 0 In Toth v.
Quarles, it prohibited court-martialing men separated from the serv-
ice."17 Even Relford v. Commandant, the most recent Supreme Court
decision on military jurisdiction, followed the "least possible power"
test, allowing military jurisdiction over on-post civilian-type offenses
only because a post commander has a legitimate concern for main-
taining the peace on a military reservation."" The "least possible
power" test is thus the military equivalent of the familiar "less drastic
means" test in constitutional law. In the civilian context, courts have
often voided vague or overbroad statutes when less drastic means
existed for accomplishing the statutes' legitimate goals." 0 The "least
possible power" test means that military laws require the same scrutiny.
The most obvious alternative is strong legislative action. Congress
113. Quoted in Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The Emergence of General
Samuel T. Ansell, 35 MIL. L. REv. 1, 15 (1967).
114. Hodson, supra note 75, at 12.
115. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 US. (6 Wheat.) 20-4, 231 (1821).
116. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
117. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22-23 (1955).
118. Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355, 363 (1971).
119. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 US. 330, 343 (1972); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 268 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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could repeal Articles 133 and 134, and enact each of the offenses listed
in the Manual for Courts-Martial as separate articles. 120 While this
proposal would eliminate vagueness, however, it would make no al-
lowance for unforeseen offenses. Also, it would fail to satisfy the
overall need for high professional standards in the military. For these
reasons, such an alternative has never attracted congressional favor.
But recent congressional dissatisfaction with Articles 133 and 134
has spurred other legislative proposals. 121 Rather than attacking the
vagueness problem directly, they have sought to minimize punishment
or remove jurisdiction to civilian courts. Senate bills introduced last
year called for violators of Articles 133 and 134 to be punished under
Article 15, which allows a commanding officer to determine sum-
marily the offender's guilt or innocence and to impose a slight punish-
ment.122 A soldier can always refuse an "Article 15" and choose a
court-martial. 12 3 Under the bills presently before Congress, a soldier
who chooses court-martial for violating the General Articles gets no
benefit. Moreover, Article 134 now includes several aggravated of-
fenses that legitimately warrant severe punishment. 24 A bill intro-
duced in the House last year would shift trials under the General
Articles to federal district courts unless the offenses occurred over-
seas. 125 Such a bill might reduce abuse, but it still leaves the vague-
ness question unanswered.
The best solution would be for the armed forces themselves to
utilize Article 92, which punishes a soldier who "violates or fails to
obey any lawful general order or regulation."'12 Each service could
issue regulations covering offenses now listed under Articles 133 and
134. For example, each branch need only promulgate a regulation
prohibiting assault with intent to commit murder to make it an of-
fense punishable under Article 92. Moreover, promulgating regula-
tions is something the services can do without waiting for con-
gressional action. The Army has already used Article 92 for some of-
fenses not greatly different from those prosecuted under Article 134.
120. Such legislation has been suggested by Gaynor, supra note 11, at 387; Hagan,
supra note 45, at 114; Nichols, supra note 46. at 136.
121. See 116 CONG. R c. 28,713 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Goodell); Wiener, supra note
105.
122. S. 4178, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); see Sherman, The Civilianization of Military
Law, 22 ME. L. R~v. 1, 78-84 (1970).
123. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (Supp. 1972); see also Remarks of Robinson Everett at Meeting
of Federal Bar Ass'n, September 17, 1970, 7 Ciui. L. REP. 2529.
124. Among them are assault with intent to commit murder and other aggravated
assaults.
125. H.R. 579, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 819 (1971).
126. 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1970).
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Thus, all marihuana offenses fall under Article 134, whereas LSD
offenses are violations of a regulation' 27 and, curiously, entail a lesser
maximum punishment.
12
Reliance on Article 92 could solve the vagueness problem almost
entirely, by substituting precise regulations for the indefiniteness of
the General Articles. 29 Of course, if the regulations themselves were
vague, the problem would remain. Thus, those offenses that are vaguely
stated in the Manual-such as "uttering disloyal statements"-would
remain equally obnoxious if promulgated as regulations. A vague
regulation would be as susceptible to constitutional attack as a vague
statute. At any rate, the vast majority of offenses listed in the Manual
are precise enough for regulations.
Article 92 also enables an adequate response to unanticipated of-
fenses. As soon as a serviceman commits an unforeseen offense, the
local command could issue a new regulation prohibiting it. Only
the very first offender would go unpunished, and his example would
seem to be a negligible burden on military discipline. By exchanging
information at the Judge Advocate General's level, the services could
profit by each other's experience.
Although the military could adopt this proposal even if Congress
refuses to act, Congress could improve the situation by deleting
references to conduct "unbecoming to an officer and a gentleman,"
"to the prejudice of good order and discipline," or "of such a nature
as to bring discredit," from the specific list of articles, and amalga-
mating them into a statement of purpose introducing the punitive
articles. In so doing, legislators would recognize the unique nature
127. Army Reg. 600-50, para. 18.1, change 2 (Apr. 13, 1970).
128. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES 127 (c) (rev. ed. 1969). In1 order to
use Article 92 effectively, the Table of Maximum Punishments would have to be
changed slightly. As the Table now reads, an offense under Article 92 carries a maximum
penalty of two years confinement at hard labor, dishonorable discharge, and forfeiture of
all pay and allowances. Violators of Articles 133 and 134, on the other hand, now face
maximum penalties from one month to twenty years confinement at hard labor. Since
some Article 134 offenses are quite serious, the Table's two year maximum for Article
92 will be inappropriate in some cases. Footnote 5 to the Table of Maximum Punish.
ments foresees part of the problem:
The punishment for this offense [i.e., violation of Article 92] does not apply In
those cases wherein the accused is found guilty of an offense which, although l.it
volving a failure to obey a lawful order, is specifically listed elsewhere in this table.
As a result, existing 134 offenses need only be listed as specific offenses carrylig special
maximum penalties under Article 92. Since the President issues the Table oE Maxiniu
Punishments on the recommendation of a joint service committee, the armed forces
could quickly facilitate the minor change. Another way to solve this problem would
be to list all forms of assault under Article 128. Gaynor, supra note 11, at 287. But this
solution would not allow for some new serious offense arising, unless Article 128 were
used in addition to Article 92. See Hodson, supra note 75, at 12.
129. See Southern v. Bd. of Trnstees, 318 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Whitfield
v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 898 (E.D. Ill. 1970) (Cummings, J., dissenting).
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of the General Articles. Unlike all the other punitive articles, which
proscribe relatively specific conduct like murder, robbery, or dis-
obedience of an order, the General Articles aim at general standards
of conduct, not particular acts. 3 0 The entire goal of military law is,
after all, to prevent conduct prejudicial to good order and disci-
pline.131 "Conduct unbecoming" and "discreditable conduct" are of-
fenses solely because of the opinions of other people. The crux of
those offenses is that when people learn of the conduct, they think
less of the actor and perhaps of the institution with which he is as-
sociated. Using the language of Articles 133 and 134 as an introduc-
tion to specific punitive articles would allow military law to main-
tain its cherished standards.
Admittedly, the proposed solution using Article 92 may raise prob-
lems of its own. First, it might not have much practical benefit for
the average serviceman. Most servicemen do not read every regu-
lation any more than they read the Manual for Courts-Martial. As a
consequence, it might be objected that using Article 92 solves academic
problems while not truly helping the GI. But this objection constitutes
an attack on the vagueness doctrine itself, since that doctrine is prem-
ised on the fiction that potential criminals consult the law before they
act. For the general run of cases, of course, notice is something of a
fiction. But the vagueness doctrine does more than guarantee notice.
By compelling government to make an explicit choice, it eliminates
or greatly reduces the area for arbitrary or discriminatory enforce-
ment. As the Court said in one of its most recent vagueness cases,
"The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness."1 32
A precise list of offenses under Article 92 should similarly afford
some protection for the ordinary serviceman.
Second, the Article 92 proposal still leaves a separation of powers
problem, since the power to issue regulations is to some extent equiva-
lent to the power to define offenses.1 33 But this is not a serious flaw.
Commanders (from the President on down) have always had inherent
130. Ackroyd, supra note 110, at 293; Hagan, supra note 45, at 79. The Court of
Military Appeals has recognized the uniqueness of the vague phrasing of the General
Articles by establishing a doctrine of preemption for them. Under that doctrine, no
conduct may be charged as a violation of the General Articles if it can be charged
as a violation of a more specific punitive article. United States v. Hale, 20 U.S.C.M.A.
150, 42 C.M.R. 342 (1970) (Article 133); United States v. McCormick, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 26,
30 C.M.R. 26 (1960) (Article 134).
131. "First and foremost, the military justice system should deter conduct which
is prejudicial to good order and disciplne." Westmoreland, Military Justice-A Com-
mander's Viewpoint, 10 Am. Cums. L. rav. 5 (1971).
132. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
133. See pp. 1523-24 supra.
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power to promulgate military regulations. The proposed solution
neither increases nor reduces that power; its attraction is that it would
eliminate vagueness without aggravating any other constitutional
problem.
The true value of the proposal is that it provides a reasonable, less
drastic alternative for accomplishing the same goals that Articles 130
and 134 supposedly achieve. 34 For the serviceman, it creates a com-
plete and precise list of offenses. 13 From the point of view of the
military, it continues to impose high standards of conduct on officers
and enlisted men, and to provide an effective means of dealing with
unforeseen crimes.
Beyond these immediate benefits, this alternative should also serve
the armed forces in other ways. Relying on Article 92, instead of
Articles 133 and 134, would eliminate a recurring object of criti-
cism. 13 6 In addition, it would avoid the inevitable embarrassment as-
sociated with a possible future court decision holding Articles 133
and 134 unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. And effecting the
suggested change without public, congressional, or judicial pressure
could only enhance the military's public image. Indeed, the apparent
commitment to a volunteer army suggests that those who join de-
serve a code of justice that at a minimum would not be unconstitu-
tionally vague when applied to common criminals. Like other re-
forms brought about by the volunteer army,13 7 rejecting the General
Articles in favor of an Article 92 approach might well boost morale
and make servicemen more effective. Hence, far from reducing disci-
pline, the proposal might well aid military units in accomplishing
their missions.
For the past twenty years, the constitutional shortcomings of mili-
tary law have offended the Supreme Court. 38 Discussing these defi-
ciencies in Reid v. Covert, Justice Black referred to Article 134 to
134. Such a proposal even has the backing of history. Usages or customs of the
service, according to Winthrop, "are now, as such, not numerous, a large proportion, In
obedience to a natural, law, having changed their form by becoming merged in written
regulations embraced in the General Regulations of the Army." WINTHROt at 41.
135. In place of Article 134, the Chief Judge of the Army Court of Military Review"would substitute three classes of offenses under Article 92, providing a separate punish-
ment for each class, depending on whether the order is issued by DOD, a Military De-
partment, or a military commander. Thus, a set of military ordinances would be pub-
lished by DOD to govern the people in the armed forces, and all would know what
the law is." Hodson, supra note 75, at 12.
136. See, e.g., R. SHERRILL, MILITARY JUSTICE Is TO JUsTICE AS MILITARY MUSG Is '1TO
Music passim (1970); Newsweek, Aug. 31, 1970, at 22.
137. See N.Y. Times, July 1, 1972, at 1, cols. 6-7.
138. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). But see Relford v.
Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
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show that, "Military law is, in many respects, harsh law which is fre-
quently cast in very sweeping and vague terms."130 In O'Callahan v.
Parker, the court-martial struck the Court not as an unbiased "instru-
ment of justice" but as "a specialized part of the overall mechanism
by which military discipline is preserved."' 40 At the same time, civilian
courts more readily and more frequently strike down vague statutes.
The expanded vagueness doctrine and the Supreme Court's close
scrutiny of military law undercut the usual justifications for the Gen-
eral Articles. Together with the fact that Article 92 makes the Gen-
eral Articles unnecessary, these are the notes that may truly sound
taps for the real Catch-22.
159. 354 U.S. at 83, n.69.
140. 395 U.S. at 265.
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